The consequences of globalization are mixed, and for the indigenous peoples of poor countries globalization has potentially important benefits. These are the result not of participation in the global economy but of participation in global networks of other indigenous peoples, environmental activists, and non-governmental organizations. Since World War II, nonstate actors such as these have gained standing in international forums. It is indigenous peoples’ growing visibility and ability to mobilize international support against the policies of their own national governments that has contributed in some important instances to their improved chances of survival (Am J Public Health. 2000;90:1531–1539).

Both historically and in the contemporary world, it is generally the case that states dominate indigenous peoples. They may displace or eliminate them, integrate them into the state, or make them pay tribute. It does not seem to matter what form of government controls the state. In this respect, at least, capitalist and communist, authoritarian and democratic governments all tend to behave similarly. Most times, tribal peoples’ contacts with the state are to their great disadvantage. One measure of disadvantage is health status (mortality and fertility, rates of population growth or decline, morbidity).

In this article I shall be concerned primarily with the impact of Europeans on the indigenous peoples of the Western Hemisphere, Oceania, and the Russian Far East. Historians have often claimed that these peoples melted away at first contact as a result of epidemics of infectious diseases introduced by Europeans. Elsewhere I have argued that while epidemics were indeed important, the contact situation itself, especially the extent of warfare and dispossession, was at least as significant in shaping the demographic and epidemiologic response to European contact. Here I will build on these debates by taking a historical view of events in the present.

I should like to argue that now as in the past, states have dominated indigenous peoples primarily for purposes of their own economic growth. As high and stable levels of economic development have been achieved in some nations, however, the tendency has been for them to pursue increasingly benign—or at least less malignant—policies with regard to their aboriginal citizens. In a global context, this raises the question of whether relatively poor and weak states in Latin America, Asia, Africa, and the former Soviet republics are likely to improve their policies toward tribal peoples only after they themselves have advanced economically.

My argument is that there is no assurance that all countries will benefit equally, or that some will benefit at all, from the global economy that has emerged since World War II. Indeed, many skeptics, of whom I am one, believe that globalization may have profoundly deleterious effects on some states and may well increase inequality among them. The erosion of sovereignty may mean that states cannot protect their industries and local employment; that laws protecting the environment and the health and safety of workers are weakened; that social spending is reduced; and that national economies are controlled by the flow of international capital. Nonetheless, there may also be benefits from globalization, including benefits for indigenous peoples in poor countries.

Wherever there is evidence in the contemporary world, indigenous people who have been incorporated into the state have lower life expectancy, lower income, and worse health than the nonindigenous inhabitants of the same state. Table 1 shows the life expectancies of indigenous and nonindigenous citizens of 3 Anglophone countries in the 1990s. Life expectancies of the nonindigenous populations of these countries differ from each other by about 2 years, with no obvious relationship to gross national product (GNP) per capita. Similarly, there is no obvious relationship between GNP per capita and the life expectancy of indigenous people in each country. Maoris in New Zealand, the poorest of these 3 countries, have a life expectancy only slightly lower than that of American Indians, in the richest country, whereas the life expectancy of Aboriginal...
Australians is by far the lowest of the populations under consideration. Elsewhere I have tried to account for these patterns, and I shall not do so again here. The point I wish to make is that in each country, the life expectancy of indigenous people is substantially less than that of nonindigenous people.

Comparable data from Latin America are not as widely available, and space limitations prohibit a detailed account of the data that do exist, but what evidence there is indicates that in Latin America as well, indigenous people are significantly more disadvantaged and have significantly lower life expectancies than nonindigenous people. Recent ecologic studies in Guatemala and Mexico, for example, indicate that regions with a high proportion of Indians have higher mortality rates than those with lower proportions of Indians. In Guatemala in 1994, with a GNP per capita of US $1200, life expectancy was 63.8 years in departments with 70% or more indigenous population and 68.6 years in departments with less than 70%. Life expectancy for the total population was 65.6 years. In Colombia in the early 1990s, when GNP per capita was US $1670, the life expectancy of indigenous peoples was about 56.5 years, compared with about 70 years for the population as a whole.

The data from the Americas and Oceania described above reflect not only the results of government policies but differences among indigenous peoples themselves, some of whom were (and are) hunter-gatherers and others of whom were agricultural peoples living in a variety of more or less complex social systems. To control some of the variation, I show in Table 2 data from one type of population, the Inuit (or Eskimos), who live under 4 different political regimes. Clearly, among both the Inuit and the nonindigenous peoples of the 3 high-income countries, there is no obvious association between GNP per capita and life expectancy at birth. In the Russian Federation, however, income is low, as is the life expectancy of both the Inuit and the total population.

All the data I have been able to find suggest that, with the striking exception of Australia, indigenous people in rich countries tend to have higher life expectancies than indigenous people in poor countries. The per capita incomes of indigenous peoples are undoubtedly important, but they are not entirely adequate to explain this phenomenon. For example, Maoris have much lower incomes than American Indians but virtually the same life expectancy. Another part of the answer is that high national wealth is associated with changes in values and policies in important segments of the dominant society, changes that encourage recognition of the rights of indigenous peoples to some level of autonomy, control of land, and access to social and health services. It is to those changes in values and policies that I now turn.

### Economic Growth and Postmaterialist Values

There is good evidence from several national and cross-national studies of a strong positive correlation between income and what Inglehart has called postmaterialist values. He writes:

> "Emphasis on economic security and on physical security will tend to go together... those who feel insecure about these survival needs have a fundamentally different outlook and political behavior from those who feel secure about them. The latter are likely to give top priority to nonmaterial goals such as self-expression, belonging, and intellectual or aesthetic satisfaction."

Postmaterialist values are associated with tolerance of differences, with environmentalism, and with education and income. The correlation between income and postmaterial values is high and positive at the ecologic level of analysis, whether countries or provinces within countries are the units, as well as at the individual level. Figure 1 illustrates this relationship, using data from the 43 nations in the World Values Survey.

Postmaterialists take for granted material well-being and economic and physical security. Thus they feel free to develop their aesthetic and intellectual interests and to concern themselves with matters of lifestyle and quality of life. They are secure enough to tolerate—indeed, to value—cultural diversity. Moreover, because most postmaterialists are urban, they are not likely to be involved in conflicts over access to natural resources. On the contrary, they value the environment for its aesthetic, recreational, and other nonextractive uses. Moreover, economic advancement is associated with increased numbers of, as well as increased membership in, voluntary associations representing a wide variety of interest groups. The reason appears to be that economic growth is associated with increasing educational levels, occupational specialization, and the emergence of service and information industries that tend to be relatively egalitarian in organization and to value innovation. There are compelling cross-national data showing that such organizational characteristics have a profound impact on individual values such as autonomy, as well as on patterns of political participation. Traditional organizations—such as churches, unions, and political parties—

## TABLE 1—Life Expectancy of Indigenous and Nonindigenous Peoples in Australia, New Zealand, and the United States, Early 1990s

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>GNP per Capita, $</th>
<th>Indigenous</th>
<th>Nonindigenous</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>18,000</td>
<td>60.4</td>
<td>77.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>13,350</td>
<td>70.5</td>
<td>76.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>25,880</td>
<td>71.1</td>
<td>75.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


**Source.** W. McLennan and R. Madden, The Health and Welfare of Australia's Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Peoples (Canberra: Australian Bureau of Statistics, 1997).


*Corrected for misclassification of race. Source. Indian Health Trends and Services (Rockville, MD: Indian Health Service, 1996)."

## TABLE 2—Life Expectancy (y) of Inuit and Nonindigenous Populations in 4 Countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Inuit</th>
<th>Nonindigenous</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Greenland</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alaska</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chukotka</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Former Soviet republic.

The perception that Indians were part of the wilderness heritage that needed to be preserved is generally traced to George Catlin, who in the 1830s was the first to call for the creation of a national park where wilderness, wildlife, and Indians would be protected. Subsequently, both Henry David Thoreau and John Muir were much influenced by their extensive contacts with Indians and Alaskan Natives. The same was true for many other conservationists and naturalists, John Wesley Powell, Mary Austin, Aldo Leopold, Robert Marshall, George Bird Grinnell, Gilford Pinchot, Ernest Thompson Seton, Luther Gulick, and John Collier among them.

In one way or another, these conservationists and naturalists thought that Indians lived in harmony with nature in a way that Euro-Americans had long since forgotten. Indeed, during the Progressive Era Indians came to represent a way of life from which industrial society had to learn if it was to survive. Organizations such as the Camp Fire Girls, as well as many summer camps, included much Indian lore and ritual in their activities. For many, no doubt, this was simply play, but for many others it meant far more. John Collier wrote:

"Into the Camp Fire Girls' ritual and daily life they [Luther and Charlotte Gulick, the
FIGURE 2—Membership (cumulative percentage of citizens belonging to 16 types of associations) in voluntary associations regressed onto gross national product (GNP) per capita, 35 countries in the World Values Survey.


Collier himself was one of the most important embodiments of the link between conservation, the idealization and protection of American Indians, and the importance of voluntary associations in influencing public policy. He was commissioner of the Bureau of Indian Affairs from 1933 until 1945, during the presidency of Franklin D. Roosevelt. He had been an activist in social reform in New York City in the first 2 decades of the century. In the early 1920s he became involved in the protection of Indian land rights and the fight against assimilationist policies, and he remained involved in Indian affairs until his death in 1968. His account of his first contact with American Indians, in Taos, NM, at Christmas time in 1920, draws together his vision of Indians and their harmony with the land:

The discovery that came to me there, in that tiny group of a few hundred Indians, was of personality-forming institutions, even now unweakened, which had survived repeated and immense historical shocks, and which were going right on in the production of states of mind, attitudes of mind, earth-loyalties and human loyalties, amid a context of beauty that suffused all the life of the group.26

Collier was not unique in this respect. Van Wyck Brooks pointed out that during the first 2 decades of the 20th century the Southwest came to play for others the same role it did for Collier. He wrote:

One might almost have foreseen at the turn of the century the days of Mabel Dodge Luhan and her circle, who realized in a sense what Mary Austin longed for, and the New Mexican literary movement in which various American writers were touched by the rhythms of Indian verse and thought. Mabel Dodge Luhan was a type of those who were soon to turn away from the "wearyly external white world," as D.H. Lawrence called it—who felt that the white man was "spoiled" and "lost" and who wished to throw off a civilization that was buried under accretions of objects, invented or collected.

The Progressive Era was also the time when social work and academic social science were just emerging as occupational specialties and when there was still much contact between nascent professionals in these fields and artists, writers, and journalists who supported progressive reforms of all sorts: in municipal government, in education, in conservation and management of natural resources, and in immigration policy, to name but a few areas. Among the vehicles for reform were voluntary associations, each advocating its own special cause.27

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Figure 3—"Nature and Civilisation."


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Founders wove a symbolism authentic and rich and profound. The symbolism was that of the Amerindians—of the only ethnic group in America which knew and used adolescence as the gateway and endless road to the union of man with man, man with earth, and man with the cosmic mystery.28
The Paradox of Globalization

The definition of globalization that I use here is more than "[the increasing integration of world capital and trade flows]." Globalization is, as well, "[a] social process in which the constraints of geography on social and cultural arrangements recede and in which people become increasingly aware that they are receding." This definition does not imply increasing cultural, political, or economic homogeneity. Indeed, globalization is every bit as likely to create heterogeneity. It is a process that has accelerated substantially since World War II, so much so that it is qualitatively and quantitatively different from what happened in the previous several centuries.

For well over a century economic historians have engaged in what they have called the standard of living debate. The optimistic argue that the industrial revolution was worth the suffering that some experienced because in the long run everyone has benefited, even if some have benefited more than others. The pessimists argue that the results of the industrial revolution were inequitably distributed and that some segments of the population suffered disproportionately and continue to suffer unfairly, even though their deprivation may be relative rather than absolute. Some of the arguments about globalization are very similar. The optimists believe that a rising tide will lift all ships; the pessimists believe that there will be growing inequalities, with the North enriching itself while large segments of the South fall farther behind.

There is little doubt that historically, globalization has resulted in improved health—at least as judged by life expectancy—for people in both rich and poor countries, although in recent decades there has been deterioration in some parts of the world. It has had a similar effect on economic growth: since the early 19th century, there has been an increase worldwide in gross domestic product (GDP) per capita, although rates of growth have been very different. Thus, although incomes have increased worldwide, it is also true that there was greater income inequality among nations and regions in the 1990s than at any time since 1820, and presumably earlier. Moreover, since 1980 there has been a significant decline in GDP per capita in Eastern Europe, and stagnation and some decline in Latin America and Africa.

The widening of income differences among regions, and the actual downturn in income in some, is congruent with the decline of life expectancy in some Eastern European and African nations. And both absolute and relative decline in income do not bode well for indigenous peoples in poor countries. For indigenous people stand in the way of exploitation of the natural resources that poor countries must undertake in order to participate in the global economy and raise their standard of living. They also stand in the way of the resettlement of large populations of poor non-indigenous people seeking new land. The process is occurring with lethal effects in Bangladesh, India, Indonesia, and Brazil, to name but a few of the largest countries.

It is not my intention to recite the history of contact between these states and their indigenous peoples. The point I wish to make is that these governments are doing what others have done before them, often with the same catastrophic effects. Globalization as we have known it since World War II is not a new cause of dispossession. Dispossession is an old phenomenon. What is new is the increasingly effective resistance to dispossession on the part of local indigenous and international actors.
In Brazil, for example, where the situation has been particularly well publicized, Rebeiro, a Brazilian anthropologist, estimated in 1957 that the Indian population had declined over the previous half century from about 1 million to less than 200,000. "In areas of agricultural expansions, six aboriginal tribes became extinct. In areas of pastoral expansion (cattle raising), thirteen tribes disappeared. In areas of extractive activities (rubber and nut collecting, diamond prospecting, etc.), a phenomenal fifty-nine tribes were destroyed." 116

Despite these losses, in 1957 there were still 120 tribes in the Amazon basin. They were, for the most part, isolated, and they lived by hunting, fishing, and gardening. In the 1960s, following the military coup, government policy began to focus on Amazonia. There had long been international interest in the resources in this region. The country’s new military leadership capitalized on that interest. Davis has written that the military worked a “global transformation in the Brazilian mining sector [that] reflected the new symbiosis that, on the national level, had emerged between the military government and a number of large multinational corporations.” 114

But it was not only multinational corporations that were involved in the development of Amazonia. US government agencies such as the Agency for International Development and the US Geological Survey provided expertise and sponsorship for mineral exploration, 46 and international lending agencies such as the Inter-American Development Bank and the World Bank provided capital. Projects involved not only mining but highway and dam construction, cattle ranching, and farming on large tracts cleared from the forest.

The rain forest turned out to be ecologically far more fragile than had been supposed, and the result of all these development activities has been ecologic destruction that has attracted world attention. 40 The Indians who stood in the way of development were also largely destroyed. Within a decade or two of first contact, epidemics of measles, tuberculosis, and other infectious diseases had begun to spread among them. 50 Prospectors, ranchers, the military, and hired killers murdered large numbers. Destruction of hunting, fishing, and farming areas contributed to malnutrition and outright starvation among the Indians. Price wrote:

Estimates of Nambiquara population at the turn of the century ran as high as 20,000; in 1938 the surviving population was estimated at 2,000 to 3,000; in 1939 at 1,500; and in 1969, at 600. The population according to the first real census, taken in 1975, was 534. The death rate for the part of the tribe that I had been able to keep track of from 1969 to 1975 was 60 per thousand, while the birth rate was 45 per thousand. Average life expectancy at birth was twenty-three years. 113

Describing the result of a 3-year gold rush in the late 1980s in part of Amazonia, Rabben observed that 65% of the indigenous population was infected with malaria, whereas before the rush malaria had been rare. “Among the Yanomami 35 percent were malnourished, and 76 percent were anemic; 13 percent of children lost one or both of their parents.” Dispersion of the survivors, coupled with high death rates, “devastated Yanomami culture and dis-aggregated Yanomami society in many areas.” 152

These ecologic and human catastrophes have been facilitated by international capital, expertise, and markets—that is to say, by globalization. The rapidity with which the calamity has occurred is remarkable, but the process is not so different from, and no more rapid than, what occurred in settler societies of the past. 53 What is very different is that there have been witnesses who have reported it internationally in great detail. 54 At least as remarkable is the reaction to these global forces. Advocacy groups and networks of associations, themselves examples of globalization of a noneconomic sort, “promote causes, principled ideas, and norms, and they often involve individuals advocating policy changes that cannot be easily linked to a rationalist understanding of their ‘interests.’” 55 I refer to the proliferation of national and international indigenous organizations, to the nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) that work with them and that helped to create them, and to the skill with which many indigenous individuals and groups have learned to use the media, the Internet, fax machines, and international forums to advance their cause. There are numerous examples, of which I mention only a few. 56

In Brazil, according to Ramos, “[I]ndigenous peoples . . . have been experimenting with various forms of organization, albeit backed up by nonindigenous support groups.” 57 Different forms of organization emerged in the 1980s and 1990s. In the early period, one national organization (the Union of Indigenous Nations, or UNI) was tried, but it failed to sustain itself. In the present decade, there has been fragmentation. There are “30 support groups run by whites, both lay and religiously oriented, and there are now no less than 109 indigenous organizations.” 58

There have been significant achievements, including “the demarcation of a large and continuous land reserve and the participation of indigenous leadership in key positions of municipal government,” but “[r]acism and impunity, the two principal villains, constantly tear away at the heart of victories.” Repeated and increasing acts of aggression have been “committed against indigenous peoples: murders of leaders, massacres, epidemic diseases caused by neglect of official health agencies, illegal detentions, and police brutality.” 59 Nonetheless, indigenous and supportive non-indigenous organizations and individuals have had an impact on slowing if not reversing private and government incursions. 60

In Mexico, the ability of Indians in Chiapas and their supporters elsewhere to call world attention to their grievances has reduced the government’s use of armed force. In this

FIGURE 4—The people of Pantelho, Chiapas, Mexico, call these mud and thatch houses home. The women in the photo are engaged in collecting firewood, water, preparing food, and caring for their children. Few of the homes in Pantelho have such “luxuries” as electricity or running water. (Courtesy of Pete Brown.)
conflict, as in many others, the use of the Internet—what has been called Netwar—has made visible abuses that in previous centuries would have gone largely unremarked.61

The representation of indigenous and nonindigenous organizations and individuals in such forums as the International Labor Organization, the Organization of American States, the Inter-American Development Bank, the World Bank, and the United Nations has also proved important. World Bank policy has evolved over the past several decades toward greater safeguards of the land and natural-resource rights of indigenous peoples in projects supported by bank funds.62 It has been recommended that the bank give “greater attention to national and international legal definitions and to consultations with governments, regional and national indigenous organizations, NGOs and academic experts.” These policies are also meant to have an impact on private sector investment and development.63

In the United Nations (UN), too, increasing attention has been paid to the rights of indigenous people. Increasingly since the founding of the UN, there has been an extension of international law to include nonstate actors.64 The creation of the Working Group on Indigenous Populations is one manifestation of this development. Signatory nations to UN and other treaties and conventions (e.g., International Labor Organization conventions 107 [1957] and 169 [1989], which recognize the rights of indigenous peoples as peoples65) acknowledge that they will abide by the international rules to which they have agreed, including, for example, rules protecting human rights. When they violate those agreements, individuals and groups often bring the violations to the attention of the UN. This is one of the ways in which the Working Group on Indigenous Populations has attempted to publicize violations of the rights of indigenous peoples.66

It is of symbolic importance that the UN declared 1993 the Year of the World’s Indigenous People and 1994 through 2003 the Decade of the World’s Indigenous People. Rigoberta Menchu, a Guatemalan Indian, was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1992. And indigenous people often invoke the World Health Organization’s definition of health when claiming the right to community control of health services, for they assert that such a holistic definition is more in accord with their concepts than with the reductionism of Western biomedicine.67

In addition to claims before the UN and other international organizations are more highly visible representations of indigenous peoples. The Kayapo in Brazil have had the support of the popular singer Sting.68 There have also been demonstrations meant to draw public attention to the injustices suffered by indigenous peoples without antagonizing the audience they mean to attract.69 Norwegian Saami hunger strikes, the Aboriginal tent embassy on the lawn of the old Parliament House in Australia, the Trail of Broken Treaties in the United States, demonstrations by Kayapo warriors in Brazil, the threat of demonstrations by Aborigines at the 2000 Olympics in Sydney—all are meant to be media events (“ethnodrama,” one writer has termed them) to draw national and international attention to grievances with which many nonindigenous people can sympathize and which they will wish to rectify. This has been called the politics of embarrassment, embarrassment of national governments in the eyes of the world.

The health consequences of these activities are hard to assess, but it seems likely that there has indeed been a growing recognition of the rights of indigenous peoples, which, in the best-publicized cases at least (e.g., in Brazil and other Latin American countries), may be having an impact on their survival. In countries where international scrutiny has been less penetrating—India, Bangladesh, China, the Russian Federation, Indonesia (until recently)—the situation is far less clear.

There are other consequences as well. Of his experience as an Australian Aboriginal representative to the Working Group on Indigenous Populations, Dodson wrote:

I was sitting in a room, 12,000 miles away from home, but if I’d closed my eyes I could just about have been in Meningrida or Doomadgee or Flinders Island. The people wore different clothes, spoke in different languages or with different accents, and their homes had different names. But the stories and the sufferings were the same. We were all part of a world community of indigenous peoples spanning the planet; experiencing the same problems and struggling against the same alienation, marginalization and sense of powerlessness. We had gathered there united by our shared frustration with the dominant systems in our own countries and their consistent failure to deliver justice. We were all looking for, and demanding, justice from a higher authority.70

Involvement in international forums, collaboration with international NGOs whose aim is to universalize the struggles of indigenous peoples, use of the Internet to facilitate communications and create informational Web sites—all are ways in which indigenous groups around the world are becoming increasingly aware of other peoples in similar situations and are mobilizing international public opinion on their own behalf. This, too, is a manifestation of globalization, and it has led not to homogenization, but to the assertion of tribal and ethnic identity and increasing claims for autonomy, and thus to differentiation.

Conclusion

Critics of globalization point to the weakening of nation-states as one of its worst consequences. For example, the World Trade Organization, often operating beyond public scrutiny, has the power to enforce economic policies governing a wide variety of activities without democratic consultation with the affected peoples,71 and structural adjustment programs have had profoundly deleterious effects in many poor countries. Indeed, it is argued, “Weak states is precisely what the New World Order, all too often looking suspiciously like a new world disorder, needs to sustain and reproduce itself. Weak, quasi-states can be easily reduced to the order required for the conduct of business, but need not be feared as effective brakes on the global companies’ business.”72

Such criticisms have much to recommend them, but they are also reminiscent of the 19th-century criticism of the transformation of gemeinschaft into gesellschaft.73 The growth of the nation-state at the expense of local communities in the 19th century is analogous to the growth of global corporations and quasi-governmental organizations at the expense of the nation-state now. Just as the destruction of local communities by national governments was said to result in mass society, alienation, and the breakdown of local cultures, so globalization is said to result in the destruction of nation-states by supranational organizations and in the growth of a world culture of consumerism driven by the mass media. But the emergence of nation-states also resulted in greater freedom for many people and in the destruction of rigid and often oppressive local hierarchies. That is to say, the consequences of the transformation were mixed, and so too are the consequences of globalization. Some nation-states weakened by globalization may become less responsive to their citizens and less democratic, as many writers have suggested; others, especially poor countries, may be forced to become less oppressive.

To the degree that the latter happens, it will be due in large part to the emergence internationally of the same process that has occurred in wealthy countries: the growth of NGOs that attempt to influence international policies to advance agendas involving protection of the environment and of indigenous peoples. Just as it was well-to-do people from the East and West Coasts of the United States who first attempted to protect the environment and American Indians, it is now pressure groups in the rich countries of the North who are trying to protect the environment and indigenous peoples of the poor countries of the South, where economic development is seen as a pressing necessity.

This is especially important in the face of the growing relative and absolute economic inequalities among regions and nations, for poor nations have especially strong incentives to make use of the resources to which their indigenous peoples lay claim. In the absence of
international pressure, their governments will have the same free hand to destroy indigenous peoples as states before them have had. Globalization, then, may provide part of an answer for the airing of injustices that have threatened the very survival of indigenous peoples and a means of redress.

Acknowledgments

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Endnotes


6. Canada is not included, because I have been unable to find Canadian data from the 1990s.

7. S.J. Kunitz, "Indigenous Health: Lessons From the United States" (lecture presented at the annual meeting of the Royal Australasian College of Physicians, Perth, Western Australia, May 12–14, 1999; to be published in the proceedings of the conference).


9. J. Sepulveda, ed. La salud de los pueblos indigenas en Mexico (Mexico City: Secretaria de Salud E Instituto Nacional Indigenista, 1993); Alfredo Mendez Dominguez, Centro de Estudios de Poblacion, Universidad del Valle de Guatemala, e-mail communication, June 23, 1999.


14. Whether anti-slavery advocates and advocates for the rights of native peoples before the early 19th century shared these values is not at issue here.


17. The rate is defined as the cumulative membership of citizens in each of 16 types of organizations, from labor unions with the largest number to peace organizations with the least. Intermediate levels of membership are found in religious organizations, sports and recreational organizations, educational and cultural organizations, political parties, professional associations, social welfare organizations, youth organizations, environmental and conservation organizations, health volunteer organizations, community action groups, women's organizations, Third World development organizations, animal rights organizations, and peace organizations. See Inglehart, Modernization and Postmodernization, 226.


29. Collier, From Every Zenith, 126.


the Kayapo and the Outlawed of Civilization
(London, England: Pluto Press, 1998), 95. The situation is complex, however. The population history of the Ache of Paraguay indicates that after an initial catastrophic loss of population during the period of early contact with Europeans, when about 30% of the population perished, life expectancy increased and is better now than it was in the "forest period" before contact. "The Ache are aware that death rates are lower on reservations than prior to contact and emphasize this as a benefit of having given up their forest lifestyle. If mortality during the first two years of life could be decreased to about 3%, the Ache population would have a life expectancy at birth of around sixty years and a mortality profile that differs little from those of other rural populations in developing countries around the world."


D. Denoon, Settler Capitalism (London, England, Oxford University Press, 1983); Crosby, Eco-

47. Davis. Victims of the Miracle.

44. D. Held, A. McRae, D. Cioldblatt, and J. Perrera-

43. M. Waters. Victims of the Miracle: Dex-clopmcnt

42. "Politics in Brief." II.

41. G. Urban and J. Sherzer, eds., International Associations, "Types of International

40. See, for example, Collier, From Every Zenith, part 5. See also Philip, John Collier's Crusade. 206. One of the organizations that Collier had supported even while he was commissioner of Indian Affairs, the Inter-American Indian Institute, in the late 1960s became the base from which dissident Mexican anthropologists launched a reexamination of "their own professional role and [a] critique [of the official tradition of paternalistic Mexican indigenismo itself]." Brysk, Tribal Village to Global Village, 64.

49. See, for example, Collier, From Every Zenith, part 6. See also Philip, John Collier's Crusade.


52. L. Rabben, Unnatural Selection: The Yanomami, Public Health Then and Now


60. M. Benavides, "Amazon Indigenous Peoples: New Challenges for Political Participation and Sustainable Development," Cultural Survival Quarterly (fall 1996): 56-53; Rabben, Unnatural Selection, 16. See also Urban and Sherzer, Na-


62. S. Davis and E. Bermudez, Technical Consulta-


66. For example, Mick Dodson, an Australian Abo-


68. Rabben, Unnatural Selection, 49.


72. Z. Bauman, Globalization: The Human Conse-
