Attorney John Gary Maynard, III
The Criminal Agency of Attorney John Gary Maynard III and Hunton & Williams Law Firm
In Dr. Horowitz’s “MOTION TO STRIKE” Eveready’s NAF filings for violations of FORUM rules, he replied to Hunton & Williams’ lead counsel for ENERGIZER trademarks, John Gary Maynard III, whose Public Record evidences Maynard’s: “(1) use of three different identities (i.e., aliases) in commerce; (2) use of the social security number of a dead person named “Lorn Sumpter;” and (3) Maynard’s criminal indictment in Guilford, NC on 12/08/1986 (Citation No. MO228914). These facts,” Horowitz testified, “are relevant and admissible in this proceeding to establish the pattern of fraud and crime counterclaimed; plus, Maynard’s criminal ‘condition of mind’ to commit extortion, theft, mail fraud, wire fraud, and unfair and deceptive trade.”
Most people get so freaked out by Maynard and his threatened lawsuits they simply fold, conceding their properties to Eveready or other Hunton & Williams’ clients.
“People don’t know laws are in place to protect them,” Dr. Horowitz explains. “They know very little about law, and how to defend themselves. They don’t know how the commercial/political game operates due to the fraudulent concealments of special interests and regulatory capture. The elements of fraud are often right in the victim’s face, but most people drop the ball, fail to respond to frightening fraudulent complaints, and grant thieves, like Maynard operating with Hunton & Williams, their properties by default.”
In Dr. Horowitz’s case against Energizer’s consumer fraud he points out the company’s intentional misrepresentations, deceit, or concealment of facts satisfying the elements of fraud, including: (1) false representations made by Maynard for Energizer and his firm, (2) with knowledge of their falsity (or without knowledge of their truth or falsity), (3) in contemplation of Horowitz’s reliance upon the false representations, (4) Horowitz’s reliance upon engaging in settlement negotiations and arbitration; and (5) damage resulting from the reliance and alliance of Eveready with Hunton & Williams, aided-and-abetted by ICANN and NAF.
The Ridiculous Reckless Claim of Domain (Trademark) Infringement
Quoting from Maynard’s justification for thievery, he claimed Horowitz’s domain names are “confusingly similar” to the word mark “ENERGIZER” because Horowitz’s “domain names contain simple misspellings or typographical errors that an Internet user might make when typing in Complainant’s mark, and add the generic terms “528,” which is a part number for a specialty battery, and “auto,” which directly relate to Complainant’s business. A simple misspelling and typo of Complainant’s mark does not sufficiently distinguish a disputed domain name and a mark.”
In other words, someone searching for Eveready’s Energizer battery would need to misspell that generic word “Energizer” by adding an “s,” then type the word “AUTO,” and also type the number “528,” in order to satisfy Hunton & Williams’s basis for characterizing Horowitz’s domain names as “confusingly similar.”
In addition to Maynard’s frivolous legal argument–“hogwash” Dr. Horowitz called it–Maynard lied or misrepresented. The “Energizer 528” battery is not a “specialty battery,” but a standard “Lantern” flashlight battery, and certainly not an automobile battery.
So Horowitz counterclaimed fraud, and he is holding Eveready, Hunton & Williams, and Maynard, each accountable for maliciously prosecuting the doctor, for filing “frivolous” and “reckless” false representations with the NAF, damaging the doctor tens of thousands of dollars.
Horowitz points to the Black’s Law Dictionary‘s definition of the word “RECKLESS” to describe Maynard’s/Energizer’s actions; meaning Maynard’s complaint is “[c]haracterized by the creation of a substantial and unjustifiable risk of harm to” Horowitz, his customers, supporters, and sales of 528 AUTO ENERGIZERS “by a conscious (or deliberate) disregard for or indifference to that risk.”
More Maynard Misrepresentations: Dr. Horowitz Warns Consumers About Lawyers’ Use of Fraudulently Misrepresented “Pseudo Case Law”
According to Model Rules of Professional Conduct (MRPC) Rule 3.1, “Meritorious Claims & Contentions,” lawyers, like Maynard, are not supposed to “bring or defend a proceeding, or assert or controvert an issue therein, unless there is a basis in law and fact for doing so that is not frivolous, . . .” But Maynard broke this rule, along with candor and honesty rules, by filing his aforementioned “confusingly similar” pleading.
Moreover, lawyers are supposed to back their claims and arguments citing legal precedents, that is, case law. But for the ICANN certified NAF to defraud Horowitz, Maynard only cited “pseudo case law.”
To justify Energizer’s aforementioned elements of “confusingly similar” domain names. Maynard cited “State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company v. shilei, FA1623634 (Nat. Arb. Forum July 14, 2015). To a lay target, that looks like a legal case citation. But it isn’t! Lay citizens would read that citation and believe it: (1) was actual case law associated with a legal precedent; and (2) supported Energizer’s argument: “(finding that ‘Respondent’s <statefarmdrivesafeandsave.com> domain name is confusingly similar to Complainant’s STATE FARM mark because it is differentiated by only the additions of the words ‘drive,’ ‘safe,’ ‘and,’ ‘save,’ and the gTLD ‘.com,’” Maynard argued.
But the facts show a pattern of misrepresentations and omissions that shame Maynard and discredit’s Energizer. The actual determination in State Farm v. shilei–an arbitration case, not a court case, was not only compromised by the fact that the Respondent, “shilei,” failed to respond. That is, like most FORUM cases filed by Maynard for Hunton & Williams clients, State Farm won by default. And if that’s not bad enough, Maynard even misrepresented the arbitration panel’s report in that case!
The actual record in Maynard’s State Farm case included that “Past panels have found that when words that describe a mark holder’s business operations are added to a mark in the creation of a domain name, the resulting domain name is confusingly similar to the mark. See Chanel, Inc. v. Cologne Zone, D2000-1809 (WIPO Feb. 22, 2001) (“CHANEL, the salient feature of the Domain Names, is identical to a mark in which Complainant has shown prior rights. The addition of the generic term, “perfumes” is not a distinguishing feature, and in this case seems to increase the likelihood of confusion because it is an apt term for Complainant’s business.”). [Emphasis added.]
In other words, CHANEL won not only by default, but based on the reasonable conclusion that the CHANELperfumes.com domain name registered by an infringer contained the identical word “CHANEL” tied to the company’s business operations in selling perfumes.
In contrast, Horowitz’s product and domain names are certainly not identical to the ENERGIZER trademark; nor are the terms “528” or “AUTO” indicative of the Complainant’s business operations directed at selling batteries. Nor is this in any way confusing consumers, since Horowitz’s business operations do not involve selling automobiles or simply the generic number “528.” Horowitz’s business operations involve selling health products, and in this instant case, pyramid energizers.
Maynard wrote that consumers would have to type mistakes to access the wrong website, and confusion would still be averted by gross differences in the products! 528 AUTO ENERGIZERS don’t resemble batteries at all, and Horowitz doesn’t look like the Energizer Bunny.
Consequently, Horowitz responded, Eveready’s main argument is frivolous and reckless in addition to being controverted by real case law. (Horowitz cited Polaroid Corporation v. Polarad Electronics Corp., 287 F. 2d 492 – Court of Appeals, 2nd Circuit 1961, that was dismissed since “neither plaintiff nor defendant had made an adequate showing with respect to confusion.” “The possibility of confusion is one that exists between distinct products that are similar in appearance and are marked deceptively.” Accordingly, the injury that is remedied by the trademark cause of action is public confusion as to the source of the goods.” Shakey’s Inc. v. Covalt, 704 F.2d 426 (9th Cir.1983); Carson Manufacturing Co., 686 F.2d at 670-71; North Carolina Dairy Foundation, Inc. v. Foremost-McKesson, Inc., 92 Cal.App.3d 98, 110, 154 Cal.Rptr. 794, 801 (1979))
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